Louisiana Law Review
Volume 76 | Number 3
Spring 2016

Legislatively Capping an Energy Lawsuit: Problems
Posed by Stripping a Pending Suit Against NinetySeven Oil and Gas Companies
Taylor Boudreaux

Repository Citation
Taylor Boudreaux, Legislatively Capping an Energy Lawsuit: Problems Posed by Stripping a Pending Suit Against Ninety-Seven Oil and Gas
Companies, 76 La. L. Rev. (2016)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol76/iss3/12

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Legislatively Capping an Energy Lawsuit: Problems
Posed by Stripping a Pending Suit Against NinetySeven Oil and Gas Companies
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 959
I.

History of Action and Reaction .................................................... 963
A. Legislative Inducement: The Causes of Act 544 ................... 963
B. Legislative Adjustment: The Legislature’s Response ............ 967

II.

The Constitutionality of Act 544 .................................................. 969
A. The Supreme Court’s Precedent in Morial Supports
Act 544’s Constitutionality .................................................... 971
1. Act 544 May be Applied Retroactively ........................... 972
a. Contracts and Due Process Protections are Not
Pertinent to Act 544’s Intended Subject.................... 972
b. Act 544 Does Not Infringe Upon the Judiciary’s
Independence ............................................................ 976
2. Act 544 Does Not Qualify as a Prohibited Local or
Special Law ..................................................................... 979
B. The Levee Authority’s Constitutional Origins Do Not
Provide Immunity .................................................................. 983

III. Act 544 Is a Necessary Solution to a Complex Problem .............. 984
A. How Does the Lawsuit Fit into the Framework of Coastal
Regulation? ............................................................................ 985
B. Act 544 is the Preferred Solution ........................................... 988
Conclusion .................................................................................... 992
INTRODUCTION
“Coastal Louisiana is vanishing,”1 and the state’s citizens are becoming
aware of that reality.2 From 1932 to 2010, the state of Louisiana has

Copyright 2016, by TAYLOR BOUDREAUX.
1. DAVID M. BURLEY, LOSING GROUND: IDENTITY AND LAND LOSS IN
COASTAL LOUISIANA 5 (2010).
2. Poll Shows that Louisiana Residents Want Oil Companies to Pay for Damage
Done to the Coast, RESTORE LA. NOW (Nov. 22, 2013), http://restorelouisiananow
.org/poll_shows [perma.cc/H6YA-5EYG] [hereinafter Poll Results] (poll showing
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diminished by 1,883 square miles.3 Many Louisianans may not have known
much about wetlands in years past, but disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, concerns over rising sea levels, and the BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico have brought the coast’s problems to the public’s attention. One
cannot realistically attach such an extreme loss—spanning over a majority
of the past century—to any one cause because the loss is the result of a
number of factors.4 The most prominent suspects are the Mississippi River
Delta’s “sedimen[t] deprivation,”5 sea level rise,6 and commercial development
of coastal wetlands.7
Crude oil and natural gas production has drastically increased in
Louisiana over much of the last century,8 and the petroleum industry’s
economic impact on the state has grown accordingly.9 That development
has not been without negative side effects, however; studies connecting the
energy industry’s coastal operations to the dramatic land loss have put these

that citizens have substantial concern over protecting the wetlands from coastal
erosion and improving flood protection in their parish).
3. BRADY R. COUVILLION ET AL., LAND AREA CHANGE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA
FROM 1932 TO 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3164/down
loads/SIM3164_Pamphlet.pdf [perma.cc/6K7W-F8NW] (“Trend analyses from 1985
to 2010 show a wetland loss rate of 16.57 square miles per year. If this loss were to
occur at a constant rate, it would equate to Louisiana losing an area the size of one
football field per hour.”).
4. See Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana is Losing a Football Field of Wetlands an
Hour, New U.S. Geological Survey Study Says, NOLA.COM (June 2, 2011, 9:37 PM),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/06/louisiana_is_losing_a_football
.html [perma.cc/R8A4-E65J] (quoting a USGS geographer, David M. Burley, Brady
Couvillion, and the director of the USGS National Wetlands Research Center in
Lafayette, Phil Turnipseed).
5. Id.
6. Saskia De Melker, Native Lands Wash Away as Sea Levels Rise, PBS (June
1, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/climate-change-janjune12-louisianacoast_05-30/ [perma.cc/263S-YZVS].
7. Bob Marshall, Science to be Key Factor in Lawsuit Against Oil and Gas
Companies for Coastal Loss, LENS (July 23, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://thelensnola.org
/2013/07/23/science-to-be-key-factor-in-lawsuit-against-oil-and-gas-companies-forcoastal-loss/ [perma.cc/53BY-A2PC].
8. See Louisiana Energy Facts and Figures, LA. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http:
//dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=208 [perma.cc/2S
K4-6ADT] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
9. Renita D. Young, Oil and Gas Industry Continues to Strongly Support
Louisiana, Study Shows, NOLA.COM (July 11, 2014, 2:33 AM), http://www.nola
.com/business/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2014/07/oil_and_gas_industry_continues.html
[perma.cc/THG7-969J].
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companies at the center of governmental and public scrutiny.10 The board of
commissioners for the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East
(“SLFPA-E”) was well aware of these studies’ findings.11 Armed with those
findings,12 the board filed suit against almost 100 oil, gas, and pipeline
companies13 that have operated in the southeast portion of the state,
specifically in the “Buffer Zone.”14 The SLFPA-E, tasked with the
construction and maintenance of flood prevention systems in the New
Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain areas,15 argued that the defendants’
production operation negatively affected the wetlands that act as a
preventative barrier or initial line of flood defense,16 which made the board’s
ability to carry out its duties more burdensome.17 The lawsuit prayed for
injunctive relief and damages, asserting negligence, strict liability, natural
servitude of drainage, public nuisance, private nuisance, and breach of
contract.18
10. See Alisha A. Renfro, New Study Examines Oil and Gas Production’s
Increased Effects on Louisiana Coastal Land Loss, RESTORE MISS. RIVER
DELTA (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.mississippiriverdelta.org/blog/2012/01/11/newstudy-examines-oil-and-gas-production%E2%80%99s-increased-effects-on-louisiana
-coastal-land-loss/ [perma.cc/YT3S-LPJ3].
11. Marshall, supra note 7.
12. Melker, supra note 6; Marshall, supra note 7.
13. Mark Schleiftstein, Historic Lawsuit Seeks Billons in Damages from Oil,
Gas, Pipeline Industries for Wetlands Losses, NOLA.COM (July 24, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/07/historic_east_bank_levee_au
tho.html [perma.cc/E5KB-UQYT].
14. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 7, Bd. of Comm’rs of the
Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 13-6911 (La. Dist. Ct.
July 24, 2013). The “Buffer Zone” is described as extending “from East of the
Mississippi River through the Breton Sound Basin, the Biloxi Marsh, and the
coastal wetlands of eastern New Orleans and up to Lake St. Catherine.” Id.
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.2(2) (Supp. 2015).
16. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 8–10.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 17–23. Months after removal, the federal district court dismissed
SLFPA-E’s suit for failure to state a claim. See Mark Schleifstein, Federal Judge
Dismisses Levee Authority’s Wetlands Damage Lawsuit Against Oil, Gas
Companies, NOLA.COM (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:52 PM), http://www.nola.com/environ
ment/index.ssf/2015/02/federal_judge_dismisses_east_b.html [perma.cc/KZ4G-KW
EL]. This dismissal order did not address Act 544 and its proposed effect on SLFPAE. See id. Additionally, the decision will inevitably be appealed. See Mark
Schleifstein, Appeal of Wetlands Damage Suit Against Energy Companies Will
Continue, NOLA.COM (March 2, 2015, 6:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment
/index.ssf/2015/03/continue_the_appeal_of_wetland.html [perma.cc/H4W3-8V28].
Because the dismissal order did not discuss Act 544’s application or legality, the issue
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The oil and gas industry, as well as the Louisiana governor, adamantly
opposed the lawsuit.19 Whether or not the industry’s political influence
prompted the legislative action, the legislature also expressed its disapproval
with the suit and acted accordingly—the 2014 legislative session saw 18
bills that related to the litigation.20 Ultimately, the legislature passed Senate
Bill 469, which the governor eventually signed into law as Act 544 (“the
Act”). Among other things, this law provides that “no state or local
governmental entity” has a cause of action related to any coastal activity,
commercial or otherwise, subject to regulation under particular state and
federal law.21 Interestingly, to achieve the conspicuous aim of the
legislators’ efforts, the law provides that its effects shall apply to all “claims
existing or actions pending on the Act’s effective date” as well as those filed
after that date.22 Legislators, commentators, and those potentially subject to
the new law made clear that the Act’s legality and actual application are far
from settled.23
The law removed the board of commissioners’ legal standing and
stripped a significant slice of authority from that constitutionally established
governmental body.24 With such drastic consequences, constitutional
arguments unsurprisingly followed the governor’s signature. Further, with
only a cursory view of media headlines, Louisiana citizens are understandably
concerned about whether the bill was in their best interest; the law precluded
a local-area board from filing suit—an apparent attempt to hold the oil and
gas industry accountable—against almost 100 companies in that industry.25
A more tempered analysis of the situation, however, reveals the
inappropriateness of the lawsuit and the true necessity of Act 544.
This Comment suggests that Act 544, though an unusual law, is both
legally sound and appropriate. The law has legislative precedent, backed by
is still unresolved, making the legal and policy analyses relevant not only for this
case’s final disposition but also for later analogous industry-wide lawsuits.
19. Mark Ballard, Louisiana House Votes to Kill Levee Board Lawsuit,
ADVOCATE (May 29, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://theadvocate.com/home/9309334125/louisiana-house-votes-to-kill [perma.cc/4292-3QK4].
20. Id.
21. Act No. 544, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw), codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:214.36(O)(1) (Supp. 2015).
22. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(O)(2).
23. See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. These statistics illustrate the public’s perception that this lawsuit stood
for “a symbol of Louisiana’s future.” Peter Moskowitz, In Louisiana, an
Environmental Lawsuit Brings Hope for a New Chapter, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 11,
2014, 7:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/11/environmentalactivistshopealawsuitopensanewchapterinlahistory.html [perma.cc/FT57-GV24].
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jurisprudential support, which leads to the conclusion that Act 544 is
constitutional. The legislature did not overstep its authority simply because
a pending suit was affected, nor did the law improperly violate the flood
protection authority’s constitutional protections. The SLFPA-E’s particular
constitutional and statutory origins make the authority susceptible to this
type of legislative action. Further, the entity’s actual purpose within the
state’s regulatory scheme supports the conclusion that the legislature acted
appropriately despite counterbalancing policy concerns.
Part I of this Comment sets out facts surrounding the board’s lawsuit
and the legislature’s response, and provides context by comparing Act 544
to similar laws. Part II describes and analyzes the legality of retroactive laws
that apply to a particular target involved in pending litigation, ultimately
concluding that Act 544 does not violate any constitutional prohibitions.
Lastly, Part III argues that, in light of the alternatives to this legislative
response, both Act 544’s means and its end are legitimate. A survey of this
lawsuit’s role within the established regulatory framework surrounding the
oil and gas industry reveals that Act 544 was the preferred solution when
considering the destructive alternatives.
I. HISTORY OF ACTION AND REACTION
The Louisiana Legislature responded to the SLFPA-E’s expansive
lawsuit by retroactively taking away its cause of action. The history and
purpose of the SLFPA-E, the agency’s grounds for filing the lawsuit, and
the legislature’s choice of responses provide essential context for analyzing
the necessity of the legislative response in Act 544.
A. Legislative Inducement: The Causes of Act 544
Congress enacted the federal Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972
due to a “national interest in the effective management, beneficial use,
protection, and development of the coastal zone.”26 The comprehensive
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012). Congress explicitly noted the oil and gas
industry’s adverse effects on the environment. Id. § 1451(c) (“The increasing and
competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone occasioned by
population growth and economic development, including requirements for
industry, commerce, residential development, recreation, extraction of mineral
resources and fossil fuels, transportation and navigation, waste disposal, and
harvesting of fish, shellfish, and other living marine resources, have resulted in
the loss of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and
adverse changes to ecological systems, decreasing open space for public use, and
shoreline erosion.”).
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scheme provided federal grants to states that submitted their own coastal
management program for approval.27 Louisiana’s submission was approved
in 1980, and the state’s Department of Natural Resources administers the
scheme.28 The legislature enacted the approved scheme under the State and
Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978.29 The main features of
the federal and state regulations concerned permitting and oversight of
coastal land use.30
In addition to coastal land use, it is necessary for Louisiana to monitor
and control the flooding tendencies along the Mississippi River and the Gulf
Coast, given the state’s position in relation to these two bodies of water.
Thus, over many years, Louisiana established multiple levee districts whose
governing boards were charged with constructing and maintaining
protective barriers, which operate as a last line of defense for the people and
property behind their banks.31 After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated
the levee system surrounding the New Orleans area in 2005, raising concerns
over the districts’ efficiency and political influence,32 the legislature amended
the state constitution to integrate several of these districts under regional flood
protection authorities.33 SLFPA-E is one of the two existing authorities.34
Before 2006, the East Jefferson, Lake Borgne, Orleans, and Tangipahoa
Levee Districts dealt with various flood protection projects in their
jurisdictions.35 The state constitution established the SLFPA-E’s oversight
27. Id. § 1455(b)–(d).
28. Coastal Management Programs, OFF. FOR COASTAL MGMT. NOAA,
http://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/#louisiana [perma.cc/UG5D-MWSA] (last
visited Oct. 22, 2015).
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:214.21 to :214.42 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
30. See id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1451–66.
31. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:307(A)(1) (2005) (The Orleans
Levee District is instructed “to locate, relocate, construct, maintain, extend, and
improve levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, breakwaters, water-basins, and
other works . . . .”).
32. Mark Schleifstein, East Bank Levee Authority Meets for First Time with
New Bobby Jindal Appointments, NOLA.COM (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:19 PM), http:
//www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/10/east_bank_levee_authority_
meet.html [perma.cc/4KZ2-DC92].
33. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 38.1.
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.1B(1)(a) (Supp. 2015). The legislature
established this authority that includes the East Jefferson, Lake Borgne, Orleans,
and Tangipahoa Levee Districts. Id.
35. See, e.g., id. § 38:307(A)(1) (“The [Orleans Levee District] shall have full
and exclusive right, jurisdiction, power, and authority to locate, relocate, construct,
maintain, extend, and improve levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, breakwaters,
water basins, and other works in relation to such projects and to conduct all
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of the districts with “the purposes of constructing and maintaining levees,
levee drainage, flood protection, and hurricane flood protection within the
territorial jurisdiction of the authority. . . .”36 Under the Louisiana
Constitution, the SLFPA-E has the power to levy taxes, employ and provide
for its employees, and to own, construct, and maintain property.37 The
SLFPA-E oversees the flood protection systems in its statutorily defined
jurisdiction and shares responsibility with the federal government for
operating and maintaining the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction
System.38 The board of commissioners of the SLFPA-E may enter into
contracts for the purpose of carrying out its powers, including “construction,
operation, and maintenance of any facilities and improvements” of projects
under their governing laws.39 Although the flood authority governs and is
comprised of these individual levee districts, the law treats the flood
authority in every respect as a distinct levee district.40 Notably, the flood
protection authority has the power to sue and be sued, just as the individual
levee districts.41
Perhaps influenced by public perception along the coast,42 the SLFPAE filed a lawsuit for damages and injunctive relief, naming 97 oil, gas, and
pipeline companies as defendants and asserting 6 separate grounds for
liability,43 centering on the defendants’ contribution to and exacerbation of
Louisiana’s coastal land loss.44 The SLFPA-E alleged that the citizens and
property within its jurisdiction were at a greater risk of flooding because of
the defendants’ underground drilling operations, the overexpansion and
dredging operations necessary in connection therewith or incidental thereto along,
over, and on the shores, bottom, and bed of Lake Pontchartrain in the parish of
Orleans . . . .”); Mission Statement, ORLEANS LEVEE DIST., http://www.or
leanslevee.com/Mission%20Statement.htm [perma.cc/7WMS-8PET] (last visited
Oct. 22, 2015) (“The District is primarily responsible for the operation and
maintenance of levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, breakwaters, water basins,
and other hurricane and flood protection improvements surrounding the City of New
Orleans, including the southern shores of Lake Pontchartrain and along the
Mississippi River. The District is responsible for the maintenance of 104.8 miles of
levees and floodwalls, 200 floodgates, 103 flood valves, and 2 flood control
structures.”).
36. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 38.1.
37. Id.
38. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 12–14.
39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.2(C).
40. Id. § 330.1(A)(1).
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:309(B) (2012).
42. Poll Results, supra note 2.
43. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 17–23.
44. Id. at 8–11.
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failed maintenance of dredged canals, and other violations of state and federal
permitting standards.45 These actions led the board to request damages arising
from the “exponentially” increasing costs to carry out its duties.46 In effect,
the entity asserted that private actors were liable for putting increased strain
on its ability to cover its rising operating costs. The SLFPA-E went beyond
asking for compensatory relief and requested that defendants take proactive
measures that the board believed would protect the coast from future land
loss.47
Attempts to kill the lawsuit began with an attack on SLFPA-E’s ability
to contract with its legal representation48 because the entity hired attorneys
on what appeared to be a contingency fee basis.49 Those opposed to the
lawsuit—including legislators and parties inside the industry—argued that
the political body did not have the authority to contract with special counsel
in this way and, further, that the contract was not properly presented to the
attorney general for approval.50 The SLFPA-E’s opposition cited apparent
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2–8.
47. Id. at 12–15. Among these forward-looking requests were for the
defendants to carry out “restoration of the coastal land loss,” including the
following: “the backfilling and revegetating of each and every canal dredged by
[Defendants];” “abatement and restoration activities determined to be appropriate,
including but not limited to, wetlands creation, reef creation, land bridge
construction, hydrologic restoration, shoreline protection, structural protection,
bank stabilization, and ridge restoration;” and “[s]uch other and further relief
which the Court deems necessary and proper.” Id. at 23–24.
48. The Louisiana Oil and Gas Association filed a separate suit against the
state attorney general to stop the Authority’s attorney contract. See Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. v.
Caldwell, No. 626798 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2014); Mark Schleifstein, Private
Attorneys Working for Louisiana Attorney General Can Do So with Contingency
Fee Contracts, Judge Rules, NOLA.COM (March 10, 2014, 1:38 PM), http://www
.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/03/private_attorneys_working_for.html
[perma.cc/X5QZ-5K79].
49. Schleiftstein, supra note 13. The contract provided that the firms would
receive 32.5% of the first $100 million of the monetary award should the board
prove to be successful, with a smaller percentage paid for any amount above $100
million. Id.
50. See Mark Schleiftstein, Judge Upholds AG Buddy Caldwell’s Approval
of Levee Authority’s Vote in Wetlands Damage Suit, NOLA.COM (Mar. 10, 2014,
4:49 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/03/judge_upholds_at
torney_general.html [perma.cc/5L72-P4LY]; Mark Schleifstein, Jindal Demands
East Bank Levee Authority Drop Lawsuit Against Oil, Gas, Pipelines (July 24, 2013,
6:41 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/07/jindal_demands
_east_bank_levee.html [perma.cc/7AL2-GYNV].
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violations of law regarding the state entity’s hiring of legal counsel,51 but
the court rejected those arguments.52 After the defendants removed the suit
to federal court,53 and the SLFPA-E established the validity of its attorney
compensation, the levee board’s suit appeared to have overcome all remaining
hurdles, except one—the political arena.
B. Legislative Adjustment: The Legislature’s Response
Several bills introduced in the 2014 legislative session set out to either
directly or indirectly hamper the levee board’s lawsuit.54 Proposed
legislation attacked nearly every aspect of the litigation, including the
structure and nomination process of board members, the board’s ability to
contract with attorneys, and restrictions on how potential award money
would be handled.55 Though legislators proposed many bills, the legislature
successfully passed what was perhaps the most effective bill. Act 544
purports to strip the ability of “certain ‘state or local governmental
entit[ies]’” to sue for violations of certain permitting schemes and other
coastal activity.56 Some legislators labeled SLFPA-E’s litigation as “clear

51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.6 (Supp. 2015) (making the state Attorney
General the Authority’s counsel); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:261 to :263 (2006)
(requiring approval of entities’ “special counsel”). The Louisiana Oil and Gas
Association advanced these arguments in a responsive lawsuit against Attorney
General Caldwell. Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 4–
8, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. v. Caldwell, No. 626798 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2014).
52. Mark Schleifstein, Judge Rules New State Law Doesn’t Stop Levee
Authority from Suing Oil Companies, NOLA.COM (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:51 PM),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/10/state_judge_rules_law_pro
hibit.html [perma.cc/XD2A-XFG4].
53. Mark Schleifstein, Environmental Lawsuit Against 92 Energy Companies
Belongs in Federal Court, Judge Rules, NOLA.COM (June 28, 2014, 10:12 PM),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/06/federal_judge_rules_east_
bank.html [perma.cc/KL2K-YFK4].
54. Ballard, supra note 19 (noting that about 18 bills were introduced that
legislative session “to clip the wings of this litigation and similar lawsuits”).
55. Id.
56. Act No. 544, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw).
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violations of law” by a state agency57 under the terms of existing law.58 The
legislature explicitly stated and expanded its understanding of existing
law—only certain governmental entities have a cause of action for activity
that certain state and federal regulations of the coast govern.59 The governor
signed the law on June 6, 2014, ten months after SLFPA-E filed suit, and
the law became effective that same day.60
A majority of Act 544’s substance was originally contained in another
bill, Senate Bill 531.61 Although both versions of the law were related to the
general topic of enforcement remedies by entities that the Coastal Zone
Management Program governed, Act 544’s final enacted language does not
mirror the provisions within its original proposed form.62 Procedurally, this
irregular presentation in the legislature made the law ripe for legal attacks,
namely those based on the state constitutional provisions regarding a “title
57. Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana Senate Approves Legislation that Would Kill
East Bank Levee Authority Wetland Lawsuit Against Energy Companies, NOLA.COM
(May 12, 2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/senate
_approves_legislation_th.html [perma.cc/JJ6Q-VMZC].
58. Presumably, those legislators referred to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 49:214.36(D), which provides a cause of action for claims similar to
SLFPA-E’s to enumerated parties. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(D) (2012).
59. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:214.36(D) now provides the
narrow exception to Act 544, meaning that the listed persons or entities in section
(D) shall have a right of action specifically related to permitting violations under
the Coastal Zone Management Act. See id.
60. Act 544 became effective upon the governor’s signature on June 6, 2014.
Act No. 544, § 1, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw); Schleiftstein, supra note 13.
61. S.B. 531, 2014 Reg. Sess. (La. 2014), available at http://www.legis
.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=225159 [perma.cc/4AXF-TF4Y]. Compare id. (“No
state or local governmental entity, except the Department of Natural Resources,
the attorney general, or the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, shall
have, nor may pursue, any right or cause of action arising from or related to a state
or federal permit issued pursuant to R.S. 49:214.21 et seq., 33 U.S.C. 1344 or 33
U.S.C. 408 in the coastal area as defined by R.S. 49:214.2(4), violation thereof,
or enforcement thereof, or for damages or other relief arising from or related to
any of the foregoing. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any contractual claims that
any state or local governmental entity may possess against the permittee are
preserved.”), with Act No. 544, § 1, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw).
62. S.B. 469, as originally introduced, provided for amendments to Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 214.36, relative to administrative and other enforcement
procedures. S.B. 469, 2014 Reg. Sess. (La. 2014), available at http://www.legis
.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=880653 [perma.cc/S857-FRYF]. The final
version of S.B. 469, enacted as Act 544, although related in subject and purpose,
differed substantially from the original provisions. Act No. 544, 2014 La. Acts
(Westlaw).
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indicative,” “germane amendments,” three readings, and local or special law
advertisement.63
The SLFPA-E further argued that the lawmakers’ rushed attempts to kill
the lawsuit affected not only the bills’ procedural formalities but also its
textual precision.64 Accordingly, in two separate lawsuits, SLFPA-E
claimed that it was neither a “state nor a local governmental entity,” thus the
law did not apply to its lawsuit.65 One state court has already determined
that the Act missed its mark.66 Lastly, the need for the legislature’s swift
response to the pending suit necessarily raised substantive concerns
regarding the legal ability to reach back and take away a party’s cause of
action.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT 544
Aside from the political and ideological fire that this situation has
stoked, Act 544 implicates several state and federal constitutional
provisions. The legislature has made a conscious decision to reach back and
directly intervene in a pending lawsuit that a constitutionally established
entity filed.67 This raises concerns related to the federal and state contracts
63. Considering the extent of the procedural issues surrounding Act 544 is
beyond the scope of this Comment. The constitutional section concerning the
passage of bills requires that “[e]very bill shall contain a brief title indicative of
its object,” that “[n]o bill shall be amended in either house to make a change not
germane to the bill as introduced,” and that every “bill shall be read at least by
title on three separate days in each house.” LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(A), (C), (D).
Contingent upon the determinations regarding whether Act 544 is a local or
special law, and whether the Act improperly deals with an enumerated, prohibited
list of subjects, the law’s passage might have violated the constitutional
requirements that local or special laws be published in affected areas for a set
amount of time and in a particular manner. Id. § 13; see also infra Part II.2.
64. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Louisiana Act 544 at 10, Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La.
Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 2:13-cv-05410 (E.D. La. June 5,
2014) (“Act 544’s convoluted path through the Louisiana legislature imbued it
with both textual and constitutional defects that cause it to be inapplicable as a
viable defense to the plaintiffs’ claims.”).
65. Act No. 544, § 1, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw); Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Louisiana Act 544,
supra note 64, at 10.
66. See Judgment, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. v. Caldwell, No. C626798 (La.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 3, 2014); Schleifstein, supra note 52.
67. See Jeff Adelson & Mark Ballard, Jindal Signs Bill that Could Kill
Wetlands Suit, ADVOCATE (June 6, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.theneworleans
advocate.com/news/9383128-171/jindal-signs-bill-that-would [perma.cc/SS3H-
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and due process clauses.68 Additionally, Act 544 includes a savings clause
for certain claims of all governmental entities, except those of a “local or
regional flood protection authority,”69 which raises the concern that the
legislature improperly aimed a local or special law at the SLFPA-E.70
Further, the legislature’s choice to retroactively amend an existing body of
law, which the court was likely to consider during the pending litigation,
may have violated the constitutional mandate of separation of powers.71
The legal issues raised by this legislation are not novel and have
presented themselves in the context of analogous situations throughout other
states’ and Louisiana’s legal history. In years past, Congress and state
legislatures have responded to unwanted, politicized lawsuits against entire
industries by stripping a plaintiff’s cause of action relating to the matter.72
These legislative responses often share common traits. For example, many
of these laws only affect a cause of action by government bodies73 and,
similar to Act 544, usually contain exceptions based on breaches of warranty
and contract.74 Most importantly, several of these statutes provide for
retroactive application to pending suits.75 These past analogues provide
legitimate legal and policy precedents to the Louisiana Legislature’s unusual
action. Additionally, Louisiana’s constitution and interpretive jurisprudence
make clear that Act 544’s application to the SLFPA-E does not violate the
Louisiana Constitution.76
HNCR]; Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.,
88 F. Supp. 3d 615 (E.D. La. 2015). The SLFPA-E is constitutionally established
in article VI, section 38.1 of the Louisiana Constitution. LA. CONST. art. VI, §38.1.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, §
23; id. art. I, § 2.
69. Act No. 544, § 5, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw).
70. LA. CONST. art. III, § 12(A).
71. Id. art. II §§ 1, 2.
72. See generally Bryce A. Jensen, Comment, From Tobacco to Health Care
and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1334 (2001) (discussing litigation against the lead paint,
tobacco, and firearm manufacturer industries).
73. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3917-1314 (West Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.24a (West Supp.
2009); see also Elizabeth T. Crouse, Note, Arming the Gun Industry: A Critique
of Proposed Legislation Shielding the Gun Industry from Liability, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1346, 1390 n.70 (2004).
74. See Crouse, supra note 73, at 1358, 1390 n.70.
75. See id. at 1390 n.70.
76. A state court has ruled to the contrary, holding that Act 544 is not only
inapplicable to the SLFPA-E but that the law is also unconstitutional. Judgment,
supra note 66, at 2. The trial court found the law’s language did not encompass the
unique status of the SLFPA-E, the law violated the Public Trust Doctrine in the
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A. The Supreme Court’s Precedent in Morial Supports Act 544’s
Constitutionality
In Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,77 the mayor of New Orleans sued
a number of firearms manufacturers, retailers, distributors, and trade
associations on the grounds that they were making and distributing
unreasonably dangerous products to the city’s citizens.78 Similar to the flood
authority’s approach, the city argued that the industry defendants’ actions
strained its financial obligations by causing an increased need for the public
services the city provided.79 The legislature, just as it did in response to the
SLFPA-E suit, stripped certain parties of their ability to file suit on the
matter.80 The law went into effect several months after the city filed suit and
contained a separate section providing for retroactive effect to “all claims
existing or actions pending on its effective date and all claims arising or
actions on and after its effective date.”81 Mayor Morial argued, and the trial
court found, that the responsive legislation was unconstitutional because the
law violated plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights, improperly
targeted plaintiffs with a special law, and affected the city’s constitutional
right to file suit.82 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
city did not possess ordinary constitutional protections afforded to individuals.83
Louisiana Constitution, the law violated the restrictions and notice requirements on
special and local laws, and the law violated the principle of separation of powers.
See id. at 1–2; Mark Schleifstein, Gov. Bobby Jindal Asks State Supreme Court to
Uphold Law Banning Wetlands Damage Suit Against Oil Companies, NOLA.COM
(Jan. 10, 2015, 9:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/01
/gov_jindal_asks_state_supreme.html [perma.cc/6Z2S-UDCZ].
77. 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001).
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id. (“Specifically, the City’s petition alleges that ‘[a]ctions by defendants
have caused the city to pay out large sums of money to provide services including
but not limited to necessary police, medical, and emergency services, health care,
police pension benefits and related expenditures, as well as to have lost substantial
tax revenues due to lost productivity.’”).
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799(A) (2008) (providing that causes of
action were abolished for any “governing authority of any political subdivision or
local or other governmental authority of the state,” reserving that right to the state
alone).
81. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 6–7 (quoting LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 40:1799).
82. Id. at 8–9. Importantly, the defendant companies did not dispute the trial
court’s decision as the holding related to a private citizen who joined the city’s
suit. Id. at 9 (“Therefore, the issues relating to Mr. Ignatik’s rights are not before
us and nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to affect his rights.”).
83. Id. at 11–13, 19.
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The Supreme Court’s analysis of these arguments controls the individual
constitutional issues surrounding Act 544.
1. Act 544 May be Applied Retroactively
Section 2 of Act 544 explains that the law’s provisions shall apply to all
claims or causes of action pending and filed in the future,84 and that Section
1 strips the causes of action that any “state or local governmental entity” had
relating to permitting schemes and various activities under state and federal
law.85 Thus, read in conjunction, the two sections purportedly operate to take
away a party’s ability to sue, notwithstanding the fact that a suit might
already have been filed and litigation commenced. As a general rule, the
Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the legislature is free to provide for
a law’s retroactivity as long as that temporal application does not violate
constitutional rules—specifically, those regarding disturbance of vested
rights, impairment of contractual obligations,86 and violation of “the
principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary.”87
a. Contracts and Due Process Protections are Not Pertinent to Act
544’s Intended Subject
The legislature explicitly provided that Act 544 would apply
retroactively,88 thus obviating the need for further inquiry into its temporal
application.89 The true test for Act 544 will be accounting for potential
constitutional violations.90 The retroactive nature of the law implicates the

84. Act. No. 544, § 2, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw).
85. Id. at § 1.
86. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 10 n.8 (citing Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc.,
783 So. 2d 1251 (La. 2001)).
87. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 404 (La.
2005).
88. Act No. 544, § 2, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw).
89. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992) (“[Louisiana
Civil Code article] 6 requires that we engage in a two-fold inquiry. First, we must
ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding
retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did so, our inquiry is at
an end. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive,
procedural or interpretive.”).
90. See Bourgeois, 783 So. 2d at 1257 (“The principle contained in [Louisiana
Civil Code article] 6, however, has constitutional implications under the Due
Process and Contract Clauses of both the United States and Louisiana
Constitutions, such that even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give
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due process and contracts clause provisions of both the Louisiana and
United States constitutions.
The contracts clauses of the Louisiana91 and United States Constitutions92
are “virtually identical” and “substantially equivalent” in their protection of
contractual obligations from retroactive laws.93 Additionally, both
constitutions similarly prohibit affecting vested rights without due process of
law.94 These clauses prevent a retroactive law’s application as applied to a
private citizen, but Act 544 does not attempt to reach a citizen’s cause of
action; thus, the intended subject of the law—a governmental body—may not
have the same defense.95
Similar to SLFPA-E, New Orleans had the “broad right” to pursue and
defend the claims in Morial.96 The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that the city was unable to invoke either of the above protections
because the Declaration of Rights in Article I of the Louisiana Constitution
only contemplates the protection of a private person’s rights.97 Under settled
a law retroactive effect, that law may not be applied retroactively if it would
impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights.”).
91. LA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted.”).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder,
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
93. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. 2001) (quoting
Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 728 (La. 1994)).
94. Carter v. State, 897 So. 2d 149, 151 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“Similar to the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution,
Article I, § 2, provides that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, except by due process of law.’”). Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides, “nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
95. For application of these state and federal clauses to a private individual’s
suit filed before the retroactive law, see example, Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish,
982 So. 2d 795, 812 (La. 2008) (holding that the law there was “unconstitutional if
made applicable to the pending, accrued, vested causes of action asserted by
plaintiff and the class he represents”); Bourgeois, 783 So. 2d at 1259 (holding that
the retrospective law, as applied to private plaintiffs, “would contravene due process
guarantees by divesting them of their vested rights in their causes of action which
accrued prior to the prior to the [sic] effective date of the Act”).
96. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 23 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
97. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“The enumeration in this constitution
of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights retained by the individual
citizens of the state.” (emphasis added)); see also Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans
Levee Dist. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 496 So. 2d 281, 287 (La. 1986) (“The
organization of the 1974 Constitution indicates that Article I, the Declaration of
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jurisprudence, political or governmental entities have no due process or
contractual obligation rights with regards to their creator’s actions.98
Further, the state may waive or impair its subdivisions’ rights because those
entities only exercise power that the legislature grants to them.99 This
analysis holds true for both the due process and contractual obligation
clauses under Louisiana’s constitution100 and the analogous provisions
under the federal constitution.101
Under the analysis in Morial, and the cases cited therein, Act 544 does
not violate any constitutional protections given to SLFPA-E under these two
clauses. Ordinarily, when a party files suit “prior to a change in the law, that
Rights Article, protects the rights of individuals against unwarrantable
government action and does not shield state agencies from law passed by the
people’s duly elected representatives.”).
98. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 11 (quoting State ex rel. Kemp v. City of Baton
Rouge, 40 So. 2d 477, 482 (La. 1949)).
99. Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 633 So. 2d 1235, 1247 (La.
1994) (“This state may constitutionally pass retrospective laws waiving or
impairing its own rights or those of its subdivisions, or imposing upon itself or its
subdivisions new liabilities with respect to transactions already passed, as long as
private rights are not infringed.”).
100. The state constitutional protections only apply to private persons. For an
application of the state contracts clause protection, found in Article I, Section 23,
of the Louisiana Constitution, see example, Rousselle, id. See also Olivedell
Planting Co. v. Town of Lake Providence, 47 So. 2d 23, 27 (La. 1950) (“The
provisions of our Constitution relating to the impairment of the obligations of
contracts only apply to contracts or vested rights of individuals or private
corporations.”). For an application of the due process clause in article I, section 2,
of the Louisiana Constitution, see example, Morial, 785 So. 2d at 13 (citing Bd.
of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 496 So. 2d at 287–88).
101. The federal provisions likewise do not protect public entities. For an
application of the federal Due Process Clause, found in the Fourteenth Amendment,
see example, Warren County, Mississippi v. Hester, 54 So. 2d 12, 18 (La. 1951)
(“[I]t is plain that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, declaring
that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
is utterly without application to the political subdivisions of a state, which cannot
be viewed as a person within the purview of the constitutional provision.”). For an
application of the Contracts Clause in Article I, section 10, clause 1, see example,
City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Ever
since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
it has been apparent that public entities which are political subdivisions of states
do not possess constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from state
impairment of contractual obligations, in the same sense as private corporations
or individuals.” (citation omitted)).
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right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due
process.”102 When a levee district103 obtains such a property right, however,
that right belongs to the state and is subject to abridgment regardless of
whether the right has vested.104 To be sure, no matter how SLFPA-E is
classified, neither the federal nor state constitutions save its lawsuit because
its status as either a state agency or some other political subdivision
disqualifies the board from that vested-right protection.105 Likewise, the
board’s apparent dual identity as agency or political subdivision does not
protect any possible contractual obligations the board may have.106
Ultimately, although this law may seem to be an unfair surprise from what
SLFPA-E expected upon filing its claim, that party’s status deprives it of the
usual defenses against a retroactive law.107 The second constitutional
102. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 33 (La. 2008),
amended on reh’g (Sept. 19, 2008) (citing Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 740 So.
2d 1262, 1268 (La. 1999)).
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.1(A)(1) (Supp. 2015) (“The Southeast
Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East and Southeast Louisiana Flood
Protection Authority-West Bank, referred to herein as ‘flood protection authority’
or ‘authority,’ are established as levee districts pursuant to Article VI, Sections 38
and 38.1 of the Constitution of Louisiana.”).
104. Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 496 So. 2d at 288–89.
105. If the levee authority is an agency, it is a “creature of the state,” and does
not enjoy due process rights against state action. State ex rel. Kemp v. City of
Baton Rouge, 40 So. 2d 477, 482 (La. 1949) (“It is the settled jurisprudence that
counties and municipalities are creatures of the State, established for the purpose
of providing effective government with functions, powers, duties and obligations
delegated or imposed by the State and that there is nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution
of the United States which would prohibit the State from making any change of
such functions, powers and obligations.” (emphasis added)). The same result is
obtained if the authority should be classified as a “political subdivision.” Morial,
785 So. 2d at 13 (citing Hester, 54 So. 2d at 18).
106. See generally Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 496 So. 2d 281
(interchangeably referring the Orleans Levee District as an agency and political
subdivision and concluding that it was not immune from statute allegedly
affecting district’s obligations); Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 633
So. 2d 1235, 1247 (La. 1994) (“This state may constitutionally pass retrospective
laws waiving or impairing its own rights or those of its subdivisions, or imposing
upon itself or its subdivisions new liabilities with respect to transactions already
passed, as long as private rights are not infringed.”).
107. In addition to this analysis, substantial support exists for the state’s
exercise of police power in regulating the oil and gas industry, especially when
the law only applies to state bodies. See Allain v. Martco P’ship, 851 So. 2d 974,
980 (La. 2003) (“The United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment and the
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argument against the retroactive law does not focus on the law’s effect on
the plaintiff individually—it instead focuses on Act 544’s attempt to remove
an action from the grips of the judiciary.
b. Act 544 Does Not Infringe Upon the Judiciary’s Independence
In Morial, the city of New Orleans also opposed the retroactive law on
the grounds that the law was the product of the legislature exercising “power
properly belonging to [the] judicial branch of government,” presumably
because the city had already filed its claim when the legislature enacted the
law.108 Similarly, SLFPA-E contended that because its “claims were already
within the jurisdiction of the courts,” the legislature improperly infringed on
the judiciary’s independence.109 Although violations of the separation of
powers doctrine operate as a constitutional bar to retroactive application,110
both SLFPA-E and the city of New Orleans misinterpreted the law.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Morial held that the retroactive statute
did not violate separation of powers principles, supporting its conclusion by
citing only cases regarding divestiture of rights without citing any direct
authority on separation of powers.111 Although a more thorough explanation
would have avoided misinterpretation, this analysis was proper. Importantly,
the statute at issue in Morial was a substantive change in the law.112 The
Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 2 and 4 serve as a reasonable restriction
on the exercise of the State’s police power. In City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357
So. 2d 1078 (La.1978), this Court defined ‘police power’ as the power of a
governmental body that reasonably regulate [sic] the citizens’ actions in order to
protect or promote public health, safety, morals, peace or general welfare.”
(citation omitted)).
108. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 19.
109. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Louisiana Act 544, supra note 64, at 23.
110. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 404 (La.
2005) (“Notwithstanding, even when the Legislature has expressed its intent to
give a substantive law retroactive effect, the law many not be applied retroactively
if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights. In a like vein,
interpretative legislation may also not be applied retroactively if the legislative
change violates the principles of separation of powers and independence of the
judiciary.” (citation omitted)).
111. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 19.
112. The Louisiana Supreme Court does not label Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 40:1799 as “substantive” in the separation of powers discussion, but it
does explain that “[t]he legislature has always enjoyed the power to create new
rights and abolish old ones as long as it does not interfere with vested rights.” Id.
at 19.
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Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Morial was made in light of prior
decisions where the Court held that when a law is not “interpretive,” and
affects substantive change in legal rights, a separation of powers discussion is
unnecessary and the only remaining question is whether the law improperly
affects vested rights or contractual obligations.113 Thus, retroactive laws have
the potential to violate the separation of powers principle only if the law is
“interpretive,” not substantive.
“Interpretive laws” are those that “do not create new rules, but merely
establish the meaning that the interpretive statute had from the time of its
enactment.”114 Even though the legislature explicitly provides that a law is
both interpretive and retroactive, the law may not retroactively overrule a
court’s previous interpretation of a long-standing law.115 The leading cases on
retroactive violations of separation of powers are confined to their facts—the
cases dealt exclusively with interpretive laws that expressly overruled judicial
decisions.116 Thus, even if Act 544 is interpretive, the law does not violate the
separation of powers principle because Act 544 does not purport to overrule
or alter a previous court’s decision regarding the law’s interpretation or

113. This concept is not novel. The Louisiana Supreme Court has previously
recognized that a discussion of separation of powers was unnecessary because of
its ultimate determination that the retroactive law was substantive. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 819 (La. 1992) (“It is this interplay
between the legislative and judicial branches that raises the separation of powers
issue which we note, but do not resolve, as we find the amendment to [Louisiana
Revised Statutes section] 23:1103(B) is not interpretive.” (emphasis added)).
114. Id. at 817.
115. Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at 406 (“By passing 2002 La. Acts 85 in
order to abrogate the appellate court’s interpretation and application of a longstanding revised statute, the Legislature clearly assumed a function more properly
entrusted to the judicial branch of government.” (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring))).
116. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533, 543–44 (La.
2005) (“In Unwired, this court recently addressed the issue of whether legislation
designated as interpretive and intended to be applied retroactively violates the
principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. In that case,
as in this one, the legislature passed an Act seeking to legislatively ‘overrule’ a
prior judicial decision. This court concluded that by passing the Act to abrogate a
court’s interpretation and application of a long-standing revised statute, the
legislature ‘clearly assumed a function more properly entrusted to the judicial
branch of government.”’ (quoting Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at 406)).
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application;117 merely changing the law before a court reviews that law does
not encroach on judicial independence. 118
Act 544, however, is truly substantive and, thus, poses no problems
related to separation of powers. A “substantive law” will “either establish
new rules, rights, and duties or change existing ones.”119 These laws focus
on an actual change in a party’s rights.120 Although some legislators sold Act
544 as a “clarification” of existing law—presumably section 49:214.36(D),
which grants causes of action to certain parties—rather than a creation of new
law,121 one should classify the law by examining its effects, without giving
regard to labels. Although the causes of action granted to specific parties in
section (D) remained, Act 544 abolished claims not only “arising from or
related to any use as defined by R.S. 49:214.23(13)” and “activity subject to
permitting under R.S. 49:214.21 et seq.,”122 but also those causes of action
relating to any activity subject to federal law and permitting.123 Act 544,
then, contemplates a much broader range of claims than the previous law
did, constituting a considerable alteration of rules and affected parties’
rights. Under Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, Act 544 does not
violate separation of powers principles, because that law substantively

117. The only decision even citing Louisiana Revised Statutes section
49:214.36(D), which appears to control which parties may sue over matters
included in SLFPA-E’s petition, discussed federal preemption of the state law,
not what parties are properly asserting claims for federal and state permitting
violations. BP Am. Inc. v. Chustz, 33 F. Supp. 3d 676 (M.D. La. 2014).
118. See, e.g., Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1309–10 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“The amendment did not alter a court-created doctrine for at that time there was
no ‘authoritative judicial interpretation of Louisiana statutory law pertinent to a
physician’s duty toward his patient.’” (quoting Ardoin v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1339 (La. 1978))).
119. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 817 (La. 1992).
120. See Rebecca Barrett Hall, Comment, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing:
Dressing-Up Substantive Legislation to Trigger the Interpretive Exception to
Retroactivity Violates Constitutional Principles, 67 LA. L. REV. 599, 614 (2007)
(“Thus, laws can be sorted by examining a single characteristic: interpretive
classification should rely on clarification of original legislative intent, and
substantive classification should depend on creation or alteration of existing
rights.”).
121. See Ballard, supra note 19.
122. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(O)(1) (Supp. 2015).
123. Specifically, Act 544 contemplates the laws in 33 U.S.C. § 408 (taking
possession of, use of, or injury to harbor or river improvements) and 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(permits for dredged or fill material).
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amends existing law,124 which only leaves questions related to parties’
rights.125
2. Act 544 Does Not Qualify as a Prohibited Local or Special Law
The principle that only general matters should be the focus of lawmakers’
resources and attention is well established.126 The Louisiana Constitution
provides that “the legislature shall not pass a local or special law” concerning
certain enumerated topics.127 The right-stripping provisions in laws like Act
544 apply prospectively to a range of potential claimants, but the law’s context
suggests that the legislature aimed the law at a particular target—the pending
suit. Just like the SLFPA-E, the city of New Orleans in Morial was the only
party with a pending suit that the new law would affect.128 The city argued
that the law’s retroactive application impermissibly targeted its suit,
violating the constitutional prohibition against local and special laws.129
In addition to violations of individual rights and separation of powers
principles, one must also recognize this constitutional provision as an
exception to the validity of a retroactive law. Before determining whether a
law impermissibly deals with those enumerated topics, the court in Morial
explained that first classifying the law as “local” or “special” is necessary;
only then can one analyze the law under this rule.130 Specifically in the
context of the Local Government Article, the constitution defines a valid
“general law” as “a law of statewide concern enacted by the legislature
which is uniformly applicable to all persons or to all political subdivisions
in the state or which is uniformly applicable to all persons or to all political
subdivisions within the same class.”131
The Morial court relied heavily on its previous decision in Kimball v.
Allstate Insurance Co. to conclude that the law at issue was valid and general
in nature.132 Kimball elaborated that a “local law” is one concerned with
geographical application; a local law “operates only in a particular locality
124. See St. Paul, 609 So. 2d at 819.
125. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
126. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 17 (La. 2001) (quoting
Kimball v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 46, 50 (La. 1998)).
127. LA. CONST. art. III, § 12(A) (“Except as otherwise provided in this
constitution, the legislature shall not pass a local or special law . . . . [c]oncerning
any civil or criminal actions . . . .”).
128. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 18.
129. Id.
130. Kimball, 712 So. 2d at 50; Morial, 785 So. 2d at 17.
131. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44.
132. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 17–19.
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or localities without the possibility of extending its coverage to other areas
should the requisite criteria exist or come to exist there.”133 Act 544’s first
section abolishes causes of action for a class of parties without geographic
limitation—the phrase “state or local governmental entity” does not connote
application to any specific area of the state.134 Section 5 of Act 544, however,
contains a savings clause for all governmental entities with an exception
expressly naming “a local or regional flood protection authority.”135
Currently, only two such entities exist in the state—the Southeast Louisiana
Flood Protection Authority-East and -West—both of which are located in the
southeast region of the state.136 Thus, one could consider Act 544
“immediately suspect as a local law,” because the law’s operation “is limited
to certain parishes.”137
Several reasons exist for specifying why the levee authorities in this
manner do not bring Act 544 within the definition of a “local” law. First,
Act 544 has the potential to apply to areas outside the southeast region of
the state if the lawmakers decide to create additional authorities, something
that is well within their power.138 In addition to the law’s ability for future
application, just because the levee authority was the only “state or local
governmental entity” with a pending suit when the law took effect does not
mean the law was local.139 Lastly, though the Louisiana Supreme Court has
suggested that a law’s application may be tied to naturally occurring,
measurable criteria such as “population, size or physical characteristics,” the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not restricted the mechanism for determining
a law’s expanded application to this type of criteria.140
133. Kimball, 712 So. 2d at 51.
134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(O)(1) (Supp. 2015).
135. Id. at § 49:214.36(5) (“Nothing in this Section shall alter the rights of any
governmental entity, except a local or regional flood protection authority, for
claims related to sixteenth section school lands or claims for damage to property
owned or leased by such governmental entity.”).
136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.1 (Supp. 2015).
137. Kimball, 712 So. 2d at 51.
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.1.
139. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 18 (La. 2001) (“The fact
that the City is the only political subdivision that has a lawsuit of this type pending
against the firearms industry does not make Section 2 a local law since the
conditions upon which Section 2 operates, all governing authorities of a political
subdivision that have actions pending on the effective date of the Act, simply do
not prevail in other localities.”).
140. Kimball, 712 So. 2d at 51 (“[A] law may be a general law even though
limited to one locality if it is general in its terms and its coverage can extend to
other areas should the requisite criteria exist there as well or if its operation is
limited to a locality through the effect of a reasonable classification such as
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Further, where a reasonable distinction supports the legislature’s
geographic limitation, the narrow application of the law may be
constitutional.141 Act 544 likely specified “local or regional flood protection
authority” because of the urgency of ending the litigation. Alternatively,
those flood protection authorities may be unique “governmental entities” in
a disaster-prone area of the state, such that the legislature wishes to deny
them access to certain property damage claims. Further, a law is not “local”
when “persons throughout the state are affected by it or it operates on a
subject in which the people at large are interested.”142 The board’s ability to
file certain suits may not directly affect citizens elsewhere in the state, but
determining how to regulate such a pervasive industry and how the
government implements that regulation are certainly statewide interests.
Because this exception to the local law prohibition is a type of deference to
the state’s police power,143 the state’s restriction on its own creation should
supersede any concerns relating to a “local” law, especially when that entity
is being prevented from involvement in litigation against an industry subject
to the state’s police power.144
Next, the Louisiana Supreme Court has defined a “special law” as “one
which operates upon and affects only a fraction of the persons . . .
population, size or physical characteristics and not solely through the specific
designation of a certain parish or parishes.” (quoting City of New Orleans v.
Treen, 431 So. 2d 390, 394 (La. 1983))). Here, Act 544 is general in its language
in that the law does not attempt to specify any area of the state and has the potential
for future application should other authorities exist later.
141. Id. (“For example, we noted in Slay, that a law which specified a fishing
net must have a certain mesh size in some parishes and a different mesh size in
others could have been constitutional, and not a local law, if the state had been
able to show a reasonable basis for the classification based on the conditions and
characteristics of the various parishes.” (citation omitted)).
142. Id.; La. Paddlewheels v. La. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 705 So. 2d 149,
156 (La. 1994); Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1134 (La. 1993).
143. See Kimball, 712 So. 2d at 51 (explaining that the Louisiana Supreme
Court previously held in Polk that a law was general because it “pertained to
matters of significant interest to the entire state, affected people throughout the
state, even though some only indirectly, and was passed to benefit the entire
state.”). Further expounding upon the exception to a regional limitation, the
Louisiana Supreme Court later explained that local and special laws are “not
intended to restrict the legislature’s exercise of its police power.” Morial, 785 So.
2d at 19.
144. Allain v. Martco P’ship, 851 So. 2d 974, 982 n.8 (La. 2003) (“In Sun Oil
Company v. State Mineral Board, the Court noted that ‘the state’s police powers
justify measures for the regulation of production with oil and gas for the
conservation of these valuable deposits.’” (citation omitted)).
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encompassed by a classification, granting privileges to some persons while
denying them to others.”145 Although Act 544 specifically excepted SLFPAE from the savings clause provision, the law applies equally to all entities
that fall into the distinct class of flood authorities—the “general body”—
and it does not single out any one in particular.146 Further, like the
jurisprudential rule on “local” laws, “special” laws have a similar exception
based on the state’s reasonable basis for the law’s narrow application.147 The
legislature may have considered particular property damage claims
unnecessary or improper in light of the levee authorities’ special roles of
monitoring flood prevention. Thus, the state may have similar policy
reasons for holding the law’s application to this particular set of
governmental actors, as the legislature did for removing these causes of
action from the special geographically situated entities.
Thus, Act 544 does not fall into the requisite categories of “local” or
“special” laws,148 obviating the need to apply the law to the enumerated list
of prohibited subjects.149 Additionally, the only questionable provision in
Act 544 is Section 5, which specifically applies to the flood protection
authorities.150 Even if a court later determines that section is invalid, the law
is severable if the remaining provisions of the law can still have effect in
that section’s absence.151 Although Act 544 is a permissible general law as

145. Kimball, 712 So. 2d at 52. More specifically, the Louisiana Supreme
Court explained, “[a] special law is one that confers particular privileges, or
imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a
common right upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body
of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.” Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (“As with a law which classifies on the basis of geographic conditions
or particularly designated localities, classification of certain parties will not render
the law special if it is based on a substantial difference between the class created
and the subjects excluded, and there is a reasonable basis for the distinction.”).
148. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 12(A)(3).
149. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1133 (La. 1993) (“Thus, if the
legislation is general rather than local or special, neither the prohibitions regarding
the enumerated subjects nor the requirement for local advertisement apply.”
(citing Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Vial, 317 So. 2d 179 (La. 1975))).
150. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(O)(5) (Supp. 2015).
151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:175(A) (2007) (“Unless otherwise specifically
provided therein, the provisions of each act of the legislature are severable,
whether or not a provision to that effect is included in the act. If any provision or
item of an act, or the application thereof, is held invalid, such invalidity shall not
affect other provisions, items, or applications of the act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision, item, or application.”).
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applied to the flood authorities, the state constitution provides for those
entities, which may limit the law’s effect on their established powers.
B. The Levee Authority’s Constitutional Origins Do Not Provide Immunity
Whereas the United States Constitution grants power to the federal
government, Louisiana’s constitution is a restriction on the otherwise
unabridged power of the state.152 Thus, the legislature is free to pass any law
that does not violate some specific constitutional provision153 that was
impliedly or expressly154 meant to prevent the legislative action.155 The same
principle applies to laws affecting the powers of constitutionally established
entities.156
In Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered amendments to the framework of administrative
law that affected powers of the commissioner of insurance.157 The court offered
a detailed history of the commissioner’s office to explain that no specifically
listed duties or powers that were protected from legislative alteration appeared
anywhere in the office’s establishment.158 The constitutional delegates, the
court noted, clearly contemplated whether to place the specific powers and
duties of the commissioner in the constitution or leave those determinations to
the legislature.159 Ultimately, the constitutional delegates wrote the provision so
that the office “has no powers, functions or duties allocated to [it] by the
constitution.”160
The Louisiana Constitution provides for the legislature’s ability to establish
regional flood protection authorities but does not provide the entities with any
particular powers that Act 544 affected. The 2006 amendments to the Local
Governmental Article of the Constitution lay out only three specific powers
152. State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers, 937 So. 2d 313, 319 (La. 2006)
(“Unlike the federal constitution, the Louisiana ‘constitution’s provisions are not
grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the
people of a state exercised through its legislature.’” (quoting La. Mun. Ass’n v.
State, 893 So. 2d 893, 843 (La. 2005))).
153. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 31 (La. 2008).
154. Id. at 31.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., State ex rel. Porterie v. Walmsley, 162 So. 826, 829 (La. 1935)
(concluding that although the Louisiana Constitution codified the citizen taxpayer
petition, the provisions did not specifically prevent the state from rearranging the
sewerage and water board’s members by statute).
157. Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746, 750 (La. 2005).
158. Id. at 758–61.
159. Id. at 767.
160. Id.
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of the regional districts: “(a) to levy taxes in such areas [and] prohibit the
levy of taxes provided for in this Section in such areas, (b) to employ and
provide for its employees, or (c) to own, construct, and maintain its
property.”161 Although the originating provision details several purposes of
the levee authority, even some unlisted and “incidental” to those listed, these
purposes do not constitute specific grants of power. Instead, “[t]he
legislature by law may establish regional flood protection authorities . . . and
provide for their territorial jurisdiction, governing authority, powers, duties,
and functions. . . .”162
Following the constitutional amendments establishing the flood
protection authorities, the legislature provided “by law” for their powers,
duties, restrictions, jurisdiction, and guidelines for the boards of
commissioners.163 The SLFPA-E is also considered a levee district, so its
board has the legislatively granted ability to sue and be sued.164 That ability
is now a general rule to which Act 544’s restriction on particular causes of
action operates as an exception.165 Just as in Wooley, Act 544 does not affect
the SLFPA-E’s constitutionally listed powers—its ability to levy taxes,
employ and pay its employees, or own, construct and maintain its property.
Rather, Act 544 is a valid exercise of the state’s authority unrestrained by
the constitution. The legislature’s ability to alter the powers granted to an
agency goes to the heart of administrative law and the system of checks and
balances. Through the state’s democratic pronouncement, the legislature
chose to regulate coastal activity through a permitting framework and only
allow particular entities to sue on related matters.
III. ACT 544 IS A NECESSARY SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM
Though serious questions persist regarding when and how the state
should hold industry players responsible for violations and potential damage
to the coast, the SLFPA-E’s attempted method is not the appropriate means.
The state’s existing coastal regulatory framework, as well as several policy
concerns, demonstrate that Act 544 was the preferred solution.

161. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 38.1(A)(2).
162. Id. § 38.1(A)(1) (emphasis added).
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:330.1 to 330.13 (Supp. 2015).
164. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:309(B) (2012).
165. See Act No. 544, § 2, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw), codified at LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 214.36(O)(1) (Supp. 2015).
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A. How Does the Lawsuit Fit into the Framework of Coastal Regulation?
The legislature has set up an entire body of law to regulate the coastal
zone and those persons who use the zone.166 The secretary of the Department
of Natural Resources is in charge of administering the state’s coastal
management program,167 which federal law approved and which governs
Louisiana’s coast.168 A part of Louisiana’s plan delegates to coastal parishes
the ability to issue coastal use permits after developing an approved
program.169 The secretary constantly scrutinizes both the permitting
decisions170 and programs developed at the local level “to ensure continued
consistency with the state program, guidelines, and with the policies and
purpose” of the state’s coastal management.171 The secretary and each parish
with an approved local coastal program have the ability to conduct “field
surveillance,”172 “issue cease and desist orders,”173 “suspend, revoke, or
modify” permits,174 and “bring such injunctive, declaratory, or other actions
as are necessary to ensure” compliance with the permitting framework along
the coast.175 Notably, however, the legislature has not entitled the flood
protection authorities to these actions.
The state did not create the SLFPA-E to file suits to enforce regulations
on the state’s wetlands or permitted uses thereof, nor does that flood
protection authority have the power to do so. Under the statutory provisions
governing which entities have the ability to enforce coastal-use standards,
the SLFPA-E is not a local government with an approved permitting
program.176 That fact alone, however, does not deprive the SLFPA-E of
potential enforcement action. The enforcement section of the Louisiana
166. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:214.21 to :214.42 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
167. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.26A(1) (2012). The secretary is in charge
of developing the “coastal management program consisting of all applicable
constitutional provisions, laws and regulations of this state which affect the
coastal zone.” Id. § 214.27(A).
168. Congress approved Louisiana’s program under the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66, in 1980. See Coastal Management
Programs, supra note 28.
169. Local Coastal Programs, LA. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, http://dnr.louisiana
.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=111&pnid=192&nid=194
[perma.cc/R63M-AQWY] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.30(C)(1) (2012).
171. Id. § 214.28(H)(3).
172. Id. § 214.36(A).
173. Id. § 214.36(B).
174. Id. § 214.36(C).
175. Id. § 214.36(D).
176. See id.
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Coastal Zone Management Program provides that “local political
subdivision[s]” without such a program may still enforce “any ordinance or
regulation relating to wetlands protection or restoration.”177 The terms
“wetlands” and “permit,” however, do not appear in any of the regional
flood authorities’ constitutional or statutory establishments.178
The legislature specifically created these authorities to construct and
maintain flood prevention systems in their jurisdictions.179 Their inferior
role in regulating use of the coastal zone in general is apparent in several
provisions in the Coastal Zone Management Act.180 By attempting to
address regulatory matters itself, the Board of Commissioners for SLFPAE hastily upset a plan of administration the state has tailored over several
decades.181 The legislature did not intend for local bodies to handle this
regulatory framework for the coast alone, especially by means of
unpredictable, high-stakes litigation.
Several factors of the lawsuit make its resolution potentially
problematic for the industry’s oversight. A government subdivision—a
piece of the larger regulatory machine—can significantly affect the
regulated industry with a suit like SLFPA-E’s. As opposed to “traditional
suits,”182 litigation that focuses on future change and which asks the court to

177. Id. § 214.36(M).
178. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 38–42; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:330.1 to
:330.13 (Supp. 2015).
179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:330.1 to :330.13.
180. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.27D(1) (2012) (“In the
development and implementation of the overall coastal management program, the
secretary shall conduct a public education program to inform the people of the state
of the provisions of this Subpart and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant
hereto, and participation and comments by . . . state, and local governmental bodies,
including port authorities, levee boards, regional organizations, planning bodies . . .
shall be invited and encouraged.” (emphasis added)).
181. For the policy goals that the secretary takes into consideration when
adopting guidelines and the management programs, see Louisiana Revised
Statutes section §214.27(C)(1)–(12).
182. Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERS L.
REV. 73, 102 (2011). To distinguish these suits from litigation with the aim of
regulation, one scholar has canvassed certain characteristics of the classic lawsuit:
the lawsuit is a contest of two “diametrically opposed interests;” the suit concerns
“retrospective” review of facts in the past; “scope of the relief is derived more or
less logically from the substantive violation;” after its disposition, the court’s role
is through; and “responsibility for fact . . . development” is exclusively among the
parties, not the court. Id. at 102–03, 111.
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assess normative values183 can function as a substitution for democratically
approved law. As an area of statewide concern, the oil and gas industry’s
regulation falls under the state’s police power.184 In this instance, SLFPA-E
has prayed for a judgment that forces the defendant companies to take actions
beyond remedying past harms based on quasi-legislative determinations
regarding who should bear responsibility for the entity’s financial woes.185
This type of “regulation through litigation,” although suspect as an
inappropriate means of handling an entire industry’s operations in the state,
has expansive implications both for the individual levee boards and the state’s
industry management as a whole.186 The courts should replace the
legislature’s role, especially at the unapproved request of one of the state’s
inferior bodies.187 Ultimately, SLFPA-E’s decision to file the suit does not

183. Abram Chayes, The Role of The Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976). This new form of regulation by litigation will
naturally differ from the traditional suits in certain respects: the scope of the suit’s
issues are “shaped primarily by the court and parties”; the parties’ structure is not
“bilateral but sprawling and amorphous”; the factual determinations are predictive
and legislative; relief is not confined to past wrongs with finite limits among the
parties but is more “forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly
remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons including
absentees”; the remedy is not involuntarily imposed but is instead the result of a
compromise; disposition of the lawsuit does not end the court’s involvement; the
judge is also responsible for “organizing and shaping the litigation to ensure a just
and viable outcome”; the litigation does not concern “a dispute between private
individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public
policy.” Id.
184. Allain v. Martco P’ship, 851 So. 2d 974, 982 n.8 (La. 2003).
185. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 7.
186. Edward Winter Trapolin, Sued into Submission: Judicial Creation of
Standards in the Manufacture and Distribution of Lawful Products—The New
Orleans Lawsuit Against Gun Manufacturers, 46 LOY. L. REV. 1275, 1284–85
(2000) (“The judiciary is being used by special interest litigants as a tool for
judicial legislation in the absence of actual legislative enactments.”); see also
Crouse, supra note 73 (discussing that supporters of a federal bill, which provided
to “‘prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition,’”
believed lawsuits of that sort were “an attempt by the judiciary to craft gun control
laws outside of the legislative process.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903
(2009)).
187. See id. at 1294 (“Ultimately, what the lawsuits against the tobacco
companies, and now the lawsuits against the handgun industry, are attempting to
do is create standards for the manufacture and distribution of any given product
through the force of overwhelming litigation costs. The net effect is to accomplish
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coincide with the regulation’s effectiveness, because the flood protection
authority attempted to circumvent the uniform democratic voice by seeking
to impose its own view of the industry’s responsibility.
Further, the lawsuit’s outcome has the potential for unforeseen
consequences. The nature of SLFPA-E’s claims has drawn attention to
whether the potential judgment might affect the similarly situated agencies
in an indirect way. For example, the only other flood protection authority in
the state, Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-West, expressed
its disapproval of the unusual suit, citing concerns that the suit’s
implications would reach far beyond the board’s territorial jurisdiction.188
Additionally, SLFPA-E’s requested remedy may involve processes beyond
its power to compel. For instance, the board requested that, at the court’s
discretion, the court force the defendant companies to backfill dredged
canals, which is an activity under the supervision of the secretary and the
Army Corps of Engineers.189 Although the levee authority has perhaps
stepped into a regulatory role for which the legislature did not create the
authority, the SLFPA-E’s intended responsibilities remain and its ability to
fulfill these responsibilities should not suffer as a result of the board of
commissioners’ hasty decision. Act 544 effectively resolves both issues.
B. Act 544 is the Preferred Solution
The legislature corrected the inappropriate lawsuit by means of an afterthe-fact denial of access to the courts. Without considering the specific
circumstances, this action might appear as an attempt to shield political and
financial interests. Although the situation might at first appear to involve
poor gamesmanship and political puppetry, in context, Act 544’s effect was
actually corrective in nature—a hard and fast solution to a potentially
destructive situation.
Among the many efforts to defeat SLFPA-E’s suit was an attempt by
the governor and the legislature to alter the board’s membership. Months
before the 2014 legislative session, the governor’s opposition to the lawsuit
led to his unprecedented rejection of the board’s nominations for vacant

in court what cannot be achieved in the state and federal legislative branches.”
(footnote omitted)).
188. Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, New Orleans Levee Authority Will Consider
45-Day Pause to Coastal Erosion Lawsuit, NOLA.COM (Aug. 15, 2013, 6:13 PM),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/08/new_orleans_levee_author
ity_wi.html [https://perma.cc/J32S-LXYM].
189. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.25(D) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(2012).
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positions.190 After making clear that he would reject any board member who
opposed his viewpoint,191 the governor followed through by removing and
subsequently instating three commissioners based on their stances on the
lawsuit.192 In an attempt to legitimize the governor’s politically motivated
rejections, the legislature later proposed an amendment to the flood
protection authority’s governing law that would eradicate some political
immunity that the board members enjoyed.193 Subsequent amendments
softened the bill’s effects, ultimately proposing that the governor have the
power to remove a commissioner in light of state law or policy violations.194
The legislature has not yet enacted this proposed law and probably never
will, assuming the lawmakers remain true to their concerns over effective,
consistent regulation. Arguably, such political influences were exactly what
the legislature intended to avoid with the authorities’ post-Hurricane Katrina
creation.195 If SLFPA-E was indeed incorrect in filing this lawsuit because
their original, specific duty is to maintain flood systems, which is a highly
technical and specialized task, then the legislature should not alter the
board’s membership and appointment process. The entity’s grave task of
overseeing effective flood diversion and prevention naturally calls for
objective determinations, which are best handled by parties that are truly
qualified and not motivated by political appeasements.
Act 544, specifically the provision that eliminates SLFPA-E’s cause of
action, halts the lawsuit and preserves the entity’s integrity as an expertisedriven body. Thus, the law does not diminish the entity’s ability to carry out
its intended tasks. Though the board may not now sue on certain claims of
regulatory import, the board is still left with all previously held capabilities,
190. See Mark Schleifstein, Levee Authority Committee Ignores Bobby Jindal
Rejection of One Nominee, Agrees to Send Him Another, NOLA.COM (Mar. 7,
2014, 3:40 AM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/03/levee
_authority_committee_igno.html [perma.cc/NB2F-WPNU]; Jeff Adelson & Mark
Ballard, Jindal Signs Bill that Could Kill Wetlands Suit, ADVOCATE.COM (June 6,
2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news /9383128171/jindal-signs-bill-that-would [perma.cc/QLW9-V8BS].
191. See Associated Press, Levee Board Re-nominates Lawsuit Supporter,
DAILYWORLD.COM (Sept. 27, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.dailyworld.com/story
/news/state/2014/09/27/levee-board-re-nominates-lawsuit-supporter/16334373/
[perma.cc/MZ86-G6R9].
192. See Adelson & Ballard, supra note 190.
193. Act No. 79, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw); see also Schleifstein, supra note 190.
194. Act No. 79, 2014 La. Acts.
195. Mark Schleifstein, East Bank Levee Authority Meets for First Time with
New Bobby Jindal Appointments, NOLA.COM (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:19 PM),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/10/east_bank_levee_authority
_meet.html [perma.cc/MU3U-9MQJ].

990

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

including the ability to maintain unbiased membership and the power to file
suit on non-prohibited matters. As for accomplishing the end goal, Act 544
justifiably attempted to prevent litigation from improperly serving as a
regulation that a state entity imposed inappropriately.196 Laws regulating
such a complex industry require a consistent, statewide pronouncement. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has previously offered its sentiment on this type
of action, making Act 544’s eventual approval all the more likely.197
The lawsuit’s potential for affecting the state’s ability to uniformly
regulate an area subject to its police power might make Act 544 an
understandable remedy in this instance, but the larger policy concern of
holding the companies responsible still remains. Coastal residents believe
that the oil and gas companies are at least partially responsible for the coastal
wetland problems, and these companies likely will not voluntarily restore
the damage done.198 A passive view of the facts surrounding SLFPA-E’s
lawsuit and the corresponding retroactive law may puzzle some—the
legislature has taken serious strides to limit lawsuits against parties whom
the public feels are responsible. Regardless of Act 544’s immediate effects,
however, the companies remain susceptible to serious liability for these
issues.
This Comment does not intend to suggest that litigation against oil and
gas companies is categorically improper. Along with the public’s perception

196. For one commentator’s comparable opinion, see Richard L. Cupp, Jr.,
State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the Domino Effect for
Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 698
(2000) (“[T]he appropriate legislative response is likely to enact legislation
limiting mass tort claims by states and other government entities. Because politics
and economics may be influencing the filing of these lawsuits, rather than a purer
quest for justice, a political response is needed. Further, the massive size of these
claims and their enormous potential impact on society create complex policy
issues that are better addressed by legislatures than by courts.”).
197. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the need for consistency in
the face of industry regulation. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1,
16 (La. 2001) (“Equally clear is the fact that consistent, exclusive statewide
regulation of the firearms industry tends in a great degree to preserve the public
safety and welfare. A scheme allowing several municipalities to file suits
effectively attempting to regulate the firearms industry in different ways and in
different degrees could conceivably threaten the public safety and welfare by
resulting in haphazard and inconsistent rules governing firearms in Louisiana.”).
198. Poll Results, supra note 2 (showing that 93% of coastal residents believe
the companies, not taxpayers, should fix the damage to the coastal wetlands; only
33% of residents along the state’s coast and 22% of residents in the New Orleans
believe the companies will repair the coast on their own).
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of the situation,199 empirical data suggests that oil and gas production has
contributed to coastal land loss.200 The legislature appears to be responsive
to these concerns and has established a framework that allows for sizeable
lawsuits against those companies in the industry.201 Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 214.36(D) expressly grants a cause of action for coastal
zone violations to many coastal parish governments.202 More notably, none
of the legislature’s industry protections have affected private citizens with
proper standing. Compared to the way other states have handled instances
of reoccurring lawsuits against an industry, Louisiana’s restrictions have
been mild.203
Looking forward, the legislature is capable of preventing this kind of
unwanted scenario created by an unauthorized state actor. The more state
lawmakers and administrators address the industry’s problems—for
example, the growing concerns over coastal land loss and the companies’
role in taking responsibility—the more likely courts are to defer to the
legislature’s studied findings.204 Also, the state should continue to act
carefully when creating and providing powers for state entities in the
199. Id.
200. See Renfro, supra note 10. Still, some studies suggest that many other
factors contribute to coastal erosion, namely groundwater withdrawal, heavily
influence “subsidence,” and that oil and gas production plays a miniscule role.
Roy K. Dokka, The Role of Deep Processes in Late 20th Century Subsidence of
New Orleans and Coastal Areas of Southern Louisiana and Mississippi, 116 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES 1, 16 (2011).
201. See, e.g., Mark Schleifstein, Jefferson, Plaquemines Parishes File Wetland
Damage Lawsuits Against Dozens of Oil, Gas, Pipeline Companies, NOLA.COM
(Nov. 12, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/11
/jefferson_plaquemines_parishes.html [perma.cc/6GCM-PVXH].
202. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(D) (2012). Specifically, 10 of the 20
coastal parishes have an approved local coastal management program, qualifying
them under the statute. Local Coastal Programs, supra note 169.
203. Statutes in Colorado, Alaska, and Illinois have prevented both private and
governmental entities from suing the firearm industry on particular causes of
action. See Crouse, supra note 73, at 1359.
204. Cupp, supra note 196, at 699–700 (“As noted above, the courts’
willingness to engage in public policy analysis expands when they perceive that
the legislatures cannot or will not address an issue. Thus, legislatures may control
state mass tort lawsuits not only through restrictive legislation, but also through
affirmatively acting to remedy corporate misconduct where appropriate. Critics
often claim that businesses and trade associations prevent legislatures from
controlling corporate excesses through lobbying and large campaign contributions.
The less a ring of truth is perceived in such allegations, the less open courts will be
to intruding on legislators’ policy-making role.” (footnotes omitted)).
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constitution, clearly indicating to a court that the legislature intends to retain
the ability to modify the entity, such as in Wooley.205 This indication would
keep public entities democratically adjustable. Additionally, explicitly
providing for how a particular entity may seek redress of any disputes,
financial or otherwise, may be wise. By proactively imposing express
limitations on the avenues a governmental body may pursue for alleged
violations in its jurisdiction, the legislature can avoid many of these
problems.
CONCLUSION
A casual survey of the Act and its context supports many state and
national concerns of whether the oil and gas industry will ever be held
accountable in Louisiana.206 When viewed in the context of SLFPA-E’s
intended role, however, Act 544 appears legitimate, especially in light of the
Coastal Zone Management Program framework. Not only did the
lawmakers act well within their legal capacity, but they also retained the
final say on coastal development regulation inside the democratic process.
Louisiana finds itself between a rock—the continuously growing
energy development industry—and a hard place—the collective opinions of
society and the scientific community. The oil and gas industry’s role on the
coast is clearly an issue of statewide concern, as the issue permeates
everyday conversation many miles from the Gulf. The size of the oil and gas
industry brings that industry within the cross hairs of Louisiana’s political
and economic interests. Importantly, the state has precedent both from
Louisiana and elsewhere that can be instructive on how to handle such a
publicly criticized, highly regulated industry. Just as in those instances
before, state policymakers should remain flexible in handling the scenario,
specifically responding to their constituents’ concerns not just for obvious
political reasons but also to proactively prevent regulatory disruption. The
judiciary and the public are more inclined to feel the industry is being
properly policed the more state policymakers take clear stances on important
issues in the coast’s development. But as for resolving already existing

205. Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746, 767 (La. 2005).
206. Steven Mufson, Oil Spills. Poverty. Corruption. Why Louisiana is
America’s Petro-State, WASH. POST (July 18, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/AR2010071602721.html [perma.cc/U34S
-DAYC].
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oversights in industry-wide regulatory frameworks, narrow laws like Act
544 function as a desired remedy.
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